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CUYAHOGA 
ALAN J. DAVIS, Special Admin istrator ) CASE NO. 312322 
of the Estate of ) 
SAMUEL H. SHEPPARD ) 
) 
Plaintiff ) 
) 
-vs- ) 
) 
STATE OF OHIO ) 
) 
Defendant ) 
) 
JUDGE RONALD SUSTER 
MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
LEAVE TO FILE AMENDED ANSWER 
Plaintiff, by and through undersigned counsel , hereby submits the attached 
Memorandum in Opposition to the State 's Motion for Leave to File Am ended Answer, filed 
on or about March 12, 1999. The reasons and authorities for denying the State's Motion 
are set forth in the attached Memorandum , which is hereby incorporated herein . 
Respectfully submitted , 
GEORGE H. CARR (0069372) 
1700 Standard Building 
1370 Ontario Street 
Cleveland , OH 44113 
(216) 241 -1430 
Attorneys for Pla intiff 
.. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
A copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Leave to File Amended Answer has been hand-delivered , this ?---~ay of April , 1999, 
to Marilyn Cassidy , Esq ., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney , at her office , 1200 Ontario 
Street, Cleveland , Ohio 44113. 
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MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION 
I. Introduction 
The instant action was originally filed on October 19, 1995, as a motion in the 
criminal case of State v. Sheppard , seeking a declaration that the Defendant was a 
wrongfully imprisoned individual. On July 24, 1996, the action was re-filed as a civil 
petition , with the present caption. On February 28 , 1997, following denial of its Motion to 
Dismiss, the State filed an Answer. Shortly thereafter, in June 1997, the State filed a 
Petition for Writ of Prohibition in the Ohio Supreme Court. The Supreme Court 
considered the State 's Petition for over a year, from June, 1997 through December, 1998, 
before ruling that the State had improperly brought the action. 
Now, on March 10, 1999, the State has sought leave to amend its Answer, only 
six months prior to the third scheduled trial date in this matter, based on the strategy 
preference of a newly appointed County Prosecutor. The State's Motion for Leave should 
be denied for three reasons: (1) a jury is not available in this matter; (2 ) even if the State 
is entitled to a jury in this matter, it would be an abuse of discretion to grant the State 's 
motion this late in litigation ; and (3) the State has failed to show that justice would be 
furthered by the granting of its motion. 
II. The State Is Not Entitled to a Jury in this Matter 
First, the State is not entitled to a jury in this action. The State's historical analysis 
begins with a false premise: that the State has the right to a jury trial. It is settled law that 
Article I, §5 of the Ohio Constitution only protects the right to a jury trial as it existed in 
1851 , long before the State had waived its sovereign immunity . See, Sorrell v. Thevenir, 
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69 Ohio St.3d 415, 633 N.E.2d 504 (1994); Belding v. State ex rel. Heifner, 121 Ohio St. 
393, 169 N.E. 301 (1929) . Thus, the State has no right to a jury trial that was broadened 
by the passage of Ohio Revised Code §2311 .04 or the Court of Claims Act. 
Furthermore , the State completely ignores the historical context of wrongful 
imprisonment claims. Before the enactment of the statutory action used here , contained 
in Ohio Revised Code §§2305.02 and 27 43.48 , aggrieved persons seeking relief for 
wrongful imprisonment had only legislative redress . Such individuals were forced to find 
a state legislator friendly to their cause , and were forced to petition the entire General 
Assembly for a special appropriat ion of funds directly to them , a proceeding that bears 
no resemb lance to a jury trial. See . Walden v. State , 47 Ohio St.3d 47, 49-50 , 547 
N.E.2d 962 , 964-65 (1989) (describing the history of "ad hoc moral claims leg islation"). 
Instead of supporting the State 's theory that it is historically entitled to a jury trial , the true 
historical background of cla ims like Plaintiff's is that no jury was ever involved . 
For the same reasons , the State 's reference to Ohio Revised Code §2311 .04 , 
allowing for juries in all suits for money damages, is inapposite. Since no jury is available 
in the Court of Claims, where this action is tried for purposes of damages, the case at bar 
is more akin to a declaratory judgment proceeding , where no party is entitled to a jury , 
rather than the money damages case the State asserts it is. 1 Furthermore , the trial court 
here, sitting with or without a jury , does not set damages; it only determines whether 
1 The Court of Claims has limited authority in setting forth damages, based upon 
specific liquidated damages stated in the statute. Unli ke trad itional liability cases , the 
wrongful imprisonment statute involves little or no discretion on the question of 
compensation . Ohio Revised Code §2723.48 . 
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Plaintiff's decedent was wrongfully imprisoned. Thus, Ohio Revised Code §2311 .04 does 
not apply, contrary to the State's assertions. 
In an effort to overcome these basic faults in its argument, the State improperly 
seeks to analogize the case at bar to a false imprisonment claim , citing Smith v. Wait , 46 
Ohio App.2d 281 , 350 N. E.2d 431 (1975) , and Bennett v. Ohio Dept. of Rehabilitation and 
Correction , 60 Ohio St.3d 107, 573 N.E.2d 633 (1991 ). However, this analogy has 
already been rejected by the Ohio Supreme Court. See , Walden , 47 Ohio St.3d at 53 , 
547 N.E.2d at 967-68 (holding that the statutory wrongful-imprisonment action "has no 
parallel in the ancient dual system of law and equity"). 
Moreover, false imprisonment claims against the State must be brought in the 
Court of Claims, see Bennett, 60 Ohio St.3d at 110-11 , 573 N.E.2d at 637 (allowing false 
imprisonment action against the State) , and no jury is available in the Court of Claims. 
See Ohio Revised Code §27 43 .11 (allowing jury trials only in claims not against the 
State) ; Ohio Revised Code §27 43.03(C)(1) (allowing three-judge panels in cases involving 
complex issues of law or fact) . Thus, the State is incorrect in stretching the analogy of 
a false imprisonment claim to the case at bar; if the General Assembly had structured the 
wrongful-imprisonment statute to require the entire action to be brought in the Court of 
Claims, no jury would be available to either party . The General Assembly 's use of local 
Courts of Common Pleas to make the threshold determination of whether a claimant was 
wrongfully imprisoned does not change this analysis: the statutory action involved here 
is fundamentally a proceeding against the State in the Court of Claims, with a preliminary 
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declaration being issued by this Court. Thus, where a jury would not be available in the 
Court of Claims, it should not be available here. 
For all the reasons stated above , the State is not entitled to a jury in this matter, 
and its Motion to Amend its Answer should be denied . 
Ill. Granting the State Leave to Amend Its Answer Would Be an Abuse of 
Discretion 
Assuming arguendo that the State has the right to a jury in this matter, it has 
waived its right by waiting over two years to assert it. Failure to enter a jury demand 
within fourteen days of the close of the pleadings constitutes a waiver. See Ohio R.Civ. P. 
38(0 ); Cassidy v. Glossip , 12 Ohio St.2d 17, 231 N.E.2d 64 (1967) ; City of Cincinnati v. 
Bossert Mach ine Co ., 16 Oh io St .2d 76, 243 N. E.2d 105 (1968). 
Seeking to revoke its waive r. the State argues that "justice requires ," in the words 
of Ohio R.Civ .P. 15(A), that its jury demand be accepted at this late stage of the 
proceed ings. However, in Turner v. Central Local Sch . Dist. , 85 Ohio St.3d 95 (1999), 
the Ohio Supreme Court stated : 
The decision of whether to grant a motion for leave to amend a pleading is 
within the discretion of the trial court. While the rule allows for liberal 
amendment, motions to amend pleadings pursuant to Civ. R. 15(A) should 
be refused if there is a showing of bad faith , undue delay , or undue 
prejudice to the opposing party . 
The motion to amend was filed after a trial date was set and two years 
and ten months after the litigation was commenced. We find that the 
trial court abused its discretion in allowing this prejudicial and 
untimely filing. 
Turner, 85 Ohio St.3d at 99. The case at bar is precisely analogous. Here, the State has 
waited more than two years since li tigation commenced under this case number in order 
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to file its motion to amend pursuant to Civ.R. 15(A). The delay since the commencement 
of litigation has been entirely due to the State's efforts to prevent this Court from hearing 
the merits of this action . Although Turner involved an amendment to add an affirmative 
defense, and the State here is attempting to add a jury demand , the Turner analysis still 
applies. A new affirmative defense creates "undue prejudice" under Turner; the State's 
efforts here have shown "undue delay" under Turner. If the failure to assert a jury 
demand for over two years does not constitute "undue delay ," the Supreme Court's 
admonishment has no effect. 
The State here has done everything it can to delay the proceedings here . It has 
demanded that the case be filed as a civil petition , has contested the propriety of the 
Plaintiff's case at every stage of litigation , and has requested an extraordinary writ that 
could not be granted . These actions all constitute "undue delay" for purposes of Turner. 
Therefore , it would be an abuse of discretion under Turner to grant the State 's Motion . 
IV. The State Has Failed to Show That "Justice Requires" Amendment of its 
Answer 
Assuming arguendo that this Court finds that the State has a right to a jury trial in 
this matter, and that it may properly exercise its discretion in determining the State's 
Motion , the State has failed to show that "justice requires" that it be allowed to amend its 
Answer. 
First, this case is best suited to a bench trial. As it is most closely analogous to 
a declaratory judgment action , the case at bar should be decided by this Court. Plaintiff 
contemplates the introduction of voluminous expert testimony , scientific evidence , and 
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documentary evidence, and the State will undoubtedly introduce similar evidence. The 
lengthy and complicated nature of this proceed ing , with its accompanying press coverage , 
would be lengthened even further by the presence of a jury, and the concomitant 
necessity for chambers conferences , hearings out of the jury 's presence , and the 
extensive voir dire necessary to ensure that no panel member has been prejudiced by the 
long-running press coverage of this matter. 
Second , the State's assertion that the appointment of a new County Prosecutor, 
and his new litigation strategy , satisfies the Rule 's requirement that amendment be 
allowed "whenever justice so requires" is unsupportable . For th is Court to hold that th is 
change in personnel serves as adequate grounds for amending plead ings filed over two 
years ago would allow the County to amend its pleadings in the dozens of lawsuits to 
which it is a party at any one time , simply by appointing a new Prosecuting Attorney . 
This does not promote "justice" in any sense of the word . A newly appointed attorney is 
always bound by the binding actions of previ ous counsel , such as fa ilure to assert 
affirmative defenses or alternate cla ims. The State is as bound by this rule as any other 
civil litigant. 
Thus , if this Court finds that it has the discretion to grant the State's motion , it 
should wisely exercise that discretion to deny the motion and hold the State to its original 
Answer. The instant action is not suited to a jury trial , based on the complexity and 
length of its proceedings. Rather than "justice" requiring a new Answer, justice would be 
furthered if th is Court were to deny the State·s Motion and allow a trial on the State's 
original Answer. 
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V. Conclusion 
For the reasons stated herein , Plaintiff requests that this Court deny the State's 
Motion to Amend its Answer pursuant to Civ.R. 15(A) , and instead let the matter stand 
for bench trial on the State's Answer as already filed . 
Respectfully submitted , 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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